Discovering Concrete Attacks on Website Authorization by Formal Analysis by Bansal, Chetan et al.
HAL Id: hal-00815834
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00815834
Submitted on 19 Apr 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Discovering Concrete Attacks on Website Authorization
by Formal Analysis
Chetan Bansal, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Sergio
Maffeis
To cite this version:
Chetan Bansal, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Sergio Maffeis. Discovering Con-








































Domaine de Voluceau, - Rocquencourt
B.P. 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex
Discovering Concrete Attacks on Website
Authorization by Formal Analysis
Chetan Bansal∗, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Antoine
Delignat-Lavaud, Sergio Maffeis†
Project-Team PROSECCO
Research Report n° 8287 — April 2013 — 46 pages
Abstract: Social sign-on and social sharing are becoming an ever more popular feature of
web applications. This success is largely due to the APIs and support offered by prominent social
networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google, on the basis of new open standards such as
the OAuth 2.0 authorization protocol. A formal analysis of these protocols must account for
malicious websites and common web application vulnerabilities, such as cross-site request forgery
and open redirectors. We model several configurations of the OAuth 2.0 protocol in the applied pi-
calculus and verify them using ProVerif. Our models rely on WebSpi, a new library for modeling
web applications and web-based attackers that is designed to help discover concrete attacks on
websites. Our approach is validated by finding dozens of previously unknown vulnerabilities in
popular websites such as Yahoo and WordPress, when they connect to social networks such as
Twitter and Facebook.
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Résumé : Sous l’effet de la gnralisation des rseaux sociaux tels que Facebook, Twitter et
Google+, les modules d’authentification unique ont t intgr une quantit croissante de sites inter-
net, phnomne amplifi depuis l’adoption de protocoles standardiss comme OAuth 2.0. L’analyse
de ces nouveaux protocoles doit tenir compte de la puissance d’un attaquant web, qui peut
exploiter des failles largement rpandues, par exemple, le cross-site request forgery ou les redi-
recteurs ouverts. Nous proposons des modles en pi-calcul appliqu pour diffrentes configurations
du protocole OAuth 2.0, que nous vrifions l’aide de ProVerif. Ces modles s’appuyent sur la
librairie WebSpi pour la modlisation des applications web et les divers attaquants correspon-
dants. Notre approche est valide par la dcouverte de plusieurs dizaines de nouvelles failles dans
des services aussi populaires que Yahoo ou Wordpress, lorsque qu’on accs eux depuis des rseaux
sociaux comme Facebook ou Twitter.
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1 Introduction
A growing number of websites now seek to use social networks to personalize each user’s browsing
experience. For example, using the social sign-on, social sharing, and social integration APIs
provided by Facebook, a website can read and write social data about its visitors, without
requiring them to establish a dedicated personal profile. Access to these APIs is mediated by an
authorization protocol that ensures that only websites that a user has explicitly authorized may
access her social data.
Web authorization protocols. After years of ad hoc authentication and authorization mechanisms
for web APIs, a series of standards have emerged. SAML [21] and other XML-based security
protocols are primarily used for SOAP-based API access, for example, on Amazon and Microsoft
Azure. OpenID [41] is used for light-weight user authentication, for example, on Google and
PayPal. OAuth [26, 33] is used for REST-based API access to social APIs, for example, on
Twitter and Facebook.
It is no longer uncommon to see websites support-
ing a variety of login options using different social net-
works. A consensus seems to be emerging around the
use of some variation or combination of the OpenID
and OAuth protocols, and OAuth 2.0 [33] is currently
the most widely supported protocol for API authoriza-
tion, especially for REST, AJAX, and JSON-based web-
sites. It is currently supported by Google, Facebook,
Microsoft, and LinkedIn among others. OpenID Con-
nect [2] is a proposal to build the next version of OpenID
on top of OAuth 2.0, hence unifying API-based authentication and authorization in a single
framework.
The main novelty of OpenID and OAuth over traditional authentication and authorization
protocols is that they do not require custom software: they are designed to be embedded in
standard websites and executed by standard web browsers. All protocol messages are encoded as
HTTP requests and responses and the protocol is mediated by the user’s browser, so that the user
may authorize or deny access to her data through a familiar interface. A typical implementation
consists of server-side PHP or Python scripts running on each website and a client-side HTML
and JavaScript component that communicates with these servers to execute the protocol.
Formal analysis against web attacks The security of web authorization protocols relies
both on the design of the websites that deploy them and on browser-based mechanisms like
cookies and JavaScript. Hence, in addition to the traditional network attacker who may hijack
insecure HTTP connections, such protocols are also exposed to a new class of web attackers
who may exploit website vulnerabilities such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request
Forgery (CSRF), and open redirectors (OR) to partially compromise the client or server scripts
running these protocols. Such web vulnerabilities are widely prevalent even on popular websites
and have proved hard to eliminate [1]. Evaluating the robustness of new security mechanisms
such as web authorization against web attackers requires a precise model of browsers, servers,
and interactions between them.
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Previous works on the formal analysis of single sign-on protocols [39, 40, 32, 15, 9], account
for network attackers (e.g. as formalized by Dolev and Yao [25]) but do not model web attacks
at the level of cookies and JavaScript. Web authorization protocols have also been subject to
careful human analysis [35, 23], which can detect some potential vulnerabilities. However, most
practical vulnerabilities depend on specific deployment configurations that are too difficult to
analyze systematically by hand. Automatic tools such as Alloy [34], AVISPA [8] and ProVerif [16]
have proved to be effective in the formal analysis of security protocols and to find network-based
attacks. Can they also be used to automatically analyze web security mechanisms and find
concrete web attacks?
Akhawe et al. [7] use Alloy to develop a general model of web components and use a SAT
solver to find vulnerabilities in new security mechanisms including a Kerberos-based single sign-
on solution. In this paper, inspired by [7], we define an automated framework to find web
authorization vulnerabilities in a systematic way. We show how a protocol designer can extract
models for various compositions of web security mechanisms and verify them against different
attacker models, until she reaches a design that satisfies her specific security goals.
Our approach. We model various configurations of the OAuth 2.0 protocol in the applied pi-
calculus [3, 4] and analyze them using ProVerif [16]. Our models rely on a generic library,
WebSpi, that defines the basic components (users, browsers, HTTP servers) needed to model
web applications and their security policies. In order to express realistic security goals for a web
application, we show how to encode distributed authorization policies in the style of [24, 28, 27] in
ProVerif. The library also defines an operational web attacker model so that attacks discovered
by ProVerif can be mapped to concrete website actions closely corresponding to the actual
PHP implementation of an exploit. The model developer can fine-tune the analysis by enabling
and disabling different classes of attacks. The effectiveness of our approach is testified by the
discovery of several previously unknown vulnerabilities involving some of the most popular web
sites, including Facebook, Yahoo, and Twitter. We reported these problems and helped fixing
them.
We present a model extraction tool that generates applied pi-calculus models from website
components written using carefully-chosen subsets of PHP and JavaScript. Model extraction
frees the web security analyst from the more mundane (but error-prone) activity of encoding
protocols in ProVerif syntax, allowing her to focus on the results of the analysis instead. As an
example, we demonstrate an implementation of OAuth’s user-agent flow that can be analyzed
by our toolset; attacks found by ProVerif can then be mapped back to concrete attacks on our
implementation. We advocate the use of our automated analysis framework when designing and
prototyping the security-critical core of a new application. Once verified, this core can be easily
extended into a complete website.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are the WebSpi library (Section 4), a formal
analysis of OAuth 2.0 using WebSpi and ProVerif (Section 5), a description of new concrete
website attacks found and confirmed by our formal analysis, and a model extraction tool for
PHP websites (Section 6). A shorter version of this paper was published in CSF 2012 [12]; a
new technical contribution in this paper is the model extraction framework of Section 6. Full
ProVerif scripts, including the WebSpi library, the OAuth 2.0 model, and formal attacks, are
available online [11].
2 Social Sign-On and Social Sharing
Social sign-on (or social login) is the use of a social network to login to a third-party website,
without having to register at the website. It is a service provided by many social networks
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Figure 1: (L) Log in with Facebook on Wordpress; (R) Facebook requires authorization.
and authentication servers, using protocols such as OpenID (e.g. Google) and OAuth (e.g.
Facebook). For clarity, we henceforth adopt OAuth terminology: a user who owns some data
is called a resource owner, a website that holds user data and offers API access to it is called a
resource server, and a third party that wishes to access this data is called a client or an app.
2.1 Motivating Example: Authenticated Website Comments
Consider WordPress.com, a website that hosts hundreds of thousands of active blogs with millions
of visitors every day. A visitor may comment on a blog post only after authenticating herself as
a WordPress, Facebook, or Twitter user (Figure 1-L).
When a visitor Alice clicks on “Log in with Facebook”, an authorization protocol is set into
motion where Alice is the resource owner, Facebook the resource server, and WordPress the
client. Alice’s browser is redirected to Facebook.com which pops up a window asking to allow
WordPress.com to access her Facebook profile (Figure 1-R). WordPress.com would like access to
Alice’s basic information, in particular her name and email address, as proof of identity.
If Alice authorizes this access, she is sent back to WordPress.com with an API access token
that lets WordPress.com read her email address from Facebook and log her in, completing the
social sign-on protocol. All subsequent actions that Alice performs at WordPress.com, such as
commenting on a blog, are associated with her Facebook identity.
Some client websites also implement social sharing : reading and writing data on the resource
owner’s social network. For example, on CitySearch.com, a guide with restaurant and hotel
recommendations, any review or comment written by a logged-in Facebook user is instantly
cross-posted on her profile feed (‘Wall’) and shared with all her friends. Some websites go even
further: Yahoo.com acts as both client and resource server to provide deep social integration where
the user’s social information flows both ways, and may be used to enhance her experience on a
variety of online services, such as web search and email.
2.2 Security goals
Let us first consider the informal security goals of the social sign-on interaction described above,
from the viewpoint of Alice, WordPress and Facebook.
 Alice wants to ensure that her comments will appear under her own name; nobody else can
publish comments in her name; no unauthorized website should gain access to her name
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and email address; even authorized websites should only have access to the information she
decided to share.
 WordPress wants to ensure that the user trying to log in and post comments as Alice, is
indeed Alice.
 Facebook wants to ensure that both the resource owner and client are who they say they
are, and that it only releases data when authorized by the resource owner.
These security goals are fairly standard for three-party authentication and authorization
frameworks, and in order to achieve them the protocol relies on two secrets: Alice’s password at
Facebook and the access token issued by Facebook to WordPress.
What makes social sign-on more interesting than traditional authentication protocols is the
need to enforce these goals under normal web conditions. For example, Alice may use the same
browser to log-in on WordPress and, in another tab, visit an untrusted website, possibly over an
insecure Wi-Fi network. In such a scenario, threats to Alice’s security goals include: network
attackers who can intercept and inject clear-text HTTP messages between Alice and WordPress;
malicious users who can try to fool Facebook or WordPress by pretending to be Alice; and
malicious websites who can try to fool Facebook or Alice by pretending to be WordPress. A web
attacker may use any combination of these three attack vectors.
2.3 Web-based attacks
Network attacks are well understood, and can be mitigated by the systematic use of HTTPS [42],
or more sophisticated cryptographic mechanisms. Many websites, such as Facebook (at the time
of writing), do not even seek to protect against network attackers for normal browsing, allowing
users to access their data over HTTP. They are more concerned about website- and browser-
based attacks, such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), SQL Injection, Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF) and Open Redirectors [1].
For example, various flavors of CSRF are common on the web. When a user logs into a
website, the server typically generates a fresh, unguessable, session identifier and returns it to
the browser as a cookie. All subsequent requests from the browser to the website include this
cookie, so that the website associates the new request with the logged-in session. However, if the
website relies only on this cookie to authorize security-sensitive operations on behalf of the user, it
is vulnerable to CSRF. A malicious website may fool the user’s browser into sending a (cross-site)
request to the vulnerable website (by using JavaScript, HTTP redirect, or by inviting the user
to click on a link). The browser will then automatically forward the user’s session cookie with
this forged request, implicitly authorizing it without the knowledge of the user, and potentially
compromising her security. A special case is called login CSRF : when a website’s login form
itself has a CSRF vulnerability, a malicious website can fool a user’s browser into silently logging
in to the website under the attacker’s credentials, so that future user actions are credited to
the attacker’s account. A typical countermeasure for CSRF is to require every security-sensitive
request to include a session-specific nonce that would be difficult for a malicious website to forge.
This nonce can be embedded in the target URL or within a hidden form field. However, such
mechanisms are still not widely deployed and CSRF attacks remain prevalent on the web, even
on respected websites.
2.4 Social CSRF attacks
We now describe one of the new attacks we found in our formal analysis of OAuth in Section 5.
This example shows how a CSRF attack on low-value client website (CitySearch.com) can be
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Figure 2: (L) CitySearch review form; (R) Corresponding Post request.
translated into an attack on its high-value resource server (Facebook.com).
Suppose Alice clicks on the social login form on CitySearch to log in with her Facebook
account. So, CitySearch obtains an API access token for Alice’s Facebook profile. If Alice then
wants to review a restaurant on CitySearch, she is presented with a form that also asks her if
she would like her review to be posted on Facebook (Figure 2-L).
When she submits this form, the review is posted to CitySearch as a standard HTTP POST
request (Figure 2-R); CitySearch subsequently reposts it on Alice’s Facebook profile (after at-
taching its API access token) on the server side.
We found that the review form above is susceptible to a standard CSRF attack; the contents
of the POST request do not contain any nonce, except for the cookie, which is automatically
attached by the browser. So, if Alice were to go to an untrusted website while logged into
CitySearch, that website could post a review in Alice’s name on CitySearch (and hence, also on
Alice’s Facebook profile.)
Moreover, CitySearch’s social login form is also susceptible to an automatic login CSRF
attack. So, if Alice has previously used social login on CitySearch, any website that Alice visits
could submit this form to silently log in Alice on CitySearch via Facebook. Alice is not asked
for permission since Facebook typically only asks a user for authorization the first time she logs
into a new client.
Combining the two attacks, we built a demonstrative malicious website that, when visited
by a user who has previously used Facebook login on CitySearch, can automatically log her into
CitySearch and post arbitrary reviews in her name both on CitySearch and Facebook. This is
neither a regular CSRF attack on Facebook nor a login CSRF attack on CitySearch (since the
user signs in under her own name). Instead, the attacker uses CitySearch as a proxy to mount
an indirect CSRF attack on Facebook, treating the API access token like a session cookie. We
call this class of attacks Social CSRF.
2.5 Attack amplification
To understand the novelty of Social CSRF attacks, it is instructive to compare Alice’s security
before and after she used social sign-on on CitySearch. Before, Alice’s reviews were subject
to a CSRF attack, but only if she visited a malicious site at the same time as when she was
logged into CitySearch. No website could log Alice automatically into CitySearch since it would
require Alice’s password. Moreover, no website would have been able to post a message on Alice’s
Facebook wall without her permission, because Facebook implements strong CSRF protections.
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But now, even if Alice uses social login once on CitySearch and never visits the site again, a
website attacker will always be able to modify both Alice’s Facebook wall and her CitySearch
reviews.
Empirically, we find that social CSRF attacks are widespread, probably because websites have
been encouraged to hastily integrate social login and social sharing without due consideration
of their security implications. Social CSRFs pose a serious threat both to resource servers and
clients, because these attacks can be amplified both ways. On one hand, as we have seen, a
CSRF vulnerability in any Facebook client becomes a CSRF on Facebook. On the other hand,
a login CSRF attack that we discovered on twitter.com (see Section 4), becomes a login CSRF
vulnerability on all of its client websites.
2.6 Towards a Systematic Discovery of Web-Based Attacks
The CitySearch vulnerability described above composes two different CSRF attacks, involves
three websites and a browser, and consists of at least nine HTTP(S) connections. It does not
depend on the details of the underlying authorization protocol, but the other vulnerabilities in
Section 5 rely on specific weaknesses in OAuth 2.0 configurations. We found such attacks by a
systematic formal analysis, and we believe at least some would have escaped a human protocol
review.
Modeling web-based attackers offers new challenges compared to the attackers traditionally
considered in formal cryptographic protocol analysis. For example, in a model that enables the
attacker to control the network, websites such as CitySearch and Facebook are trivially insecure
as most user data is sent over insecure HTTP. With such strong attacker models, we are unlikely
to discover subtle web attacks such as CSRF. Conversely, a model that treats the browser and the
user as one entity will miss CSRF attacks completely, since they rely on the browser performing
actions not intended by the user. In Section 4, we present a web security library that includes a
precise model of the browser as well as an attacker model that can be fine-tuned, enabling the
discovery of new and interesting web attacks.
3 OAuth 2.0: Browser-based API Authorization
The goal of the OAuth 2.0 protocol [33] is to enable third party clients to obtain limited access,
on behalf of a resource owner, to the API of a resource server. The protocol involves five parties:
a resource server that allows access to its resources over the web on receiving an access token
issued by a trusted authorization server ; a resource owner who owns data on the resource server,
has login credentials at the authorization server, and uses a user-agent (browser) to access the
web; a client website, that needs to access data at the resource server, and whose application
credentials are registered at the authorization server. In the example of Section 2, Facebook
is both the authorization server and resource server; we find that this is the most common
configuration.
The first version of OAuth [26] was designed to unify previous authorization mechanisms
implemented by Twitter, Flickr, and Google. However, it was criticized as being website-centric,
inflexible, and too complex. In particular, the cryptographic mechanisms used to protect autho-
rization requests and responses were deemed too difficult for website developers to implement
(correctly).
OAuth 2.0 is designed to address these shortcomings. The protocol specification defines
several different flows or protocol configurations, two of which directly apply to website appli-
cations. The protocol itself requires no cryptographic mechanisms whatsoever and instead relies
on transport layer security (HTTPS). Hence, it claims to be lightweight and flexible, and has
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Figure 3: OAuth 2.0: User-Agent Flow.
fast emerged as the API authorization protocol of choice, supported by Microsoft, Google and
Facebook, among others. We next describe the two website flows of OAuth 2.0, their security
goals, and their typical implementations.
3.1 User-Agent Flow
The User-Agent flow, also called Implicit Grant flow, is meant to be used by client applications
that can run JavaScript on the resource owner’s user-agent. For example, it may be used by
regular websites or by browser plugins. The authorization flow, adapted from the specification,
is depicted in Figure 3.
Let the resource server be located at the URL RS and its authorization server be located
at AS. Let the resource owner RO have a username u and password p at AS. Let the client be
located at URL C and have an application identifier id at AS. The message flow and relevant
security events of the user-agent flow are as follows:
1. Login(RO,b,sid,AS,u): RO using browser b starts a login session sid at AS using credentials
u,p.
2. SocialLogin(RO,b,sid’,C,AS,RS): RO using b starts a social sign-on session sid’ at C using AS
for RS.
3. TokenRequest(C,b,AS,id,perms): C redirects b to AS requesting a token for id with access rights
perms.
4. Authorize(RO,b,sid,C,perms): AS looks up id and asks RO for authorization; RO using browser
b in session sid at AS authorizes C with perms.
5. TokenResponse(AS,b,C,token): AS redirects b back to C with an access token.
6. APIRequest(C,RS,token,getId()): C makes an API request getId() to RS with token.
7. APIResponse(RS,C,token,getId(),u): RS verifies token, accepts the API request and returns u
to C.
8. SocialLoginAccept(C,sid’,u,AS,RS): C accepts RO’s social sign-on session sid’ as u at AS for RS.
9. SocialLoginDone(RO,b,sid’,C,u,AS,RS): RO is logged in to C in a browser session sid’ associated
with u at AS, granting access to RS.
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Figure 4: OAuth 2.0: Authorization Code Flow.
Here, Step 3 corresponds to action (A) in Figure 3; Step 4 corresponds to (B); Step 5 to (C)
and (D); Step 6 onwards to (E), (F), and (G).
These steps may be followed by any number of API calls from the client to the resource server,
on behalf of the resource owner. Each step in this flow consists of (at least) one HTTP request-
response exchange. The specification requires that the AS must and the C should implement
these exchanges over HTTPS. In the rest of this paper, we assume that all OAuth exchanges
occur over HTTPS unless specified otherwise.
As an example of the user-agent protocol flow, consider the social sign-on interaction between
websites like Pinterest and Facebook; the TokenRequest(C,b,AS,id,perms) step is typically imple-
mented as an HTTPS redirect from Pinterest to a URI of the form: https://www.facebook.com/
dialog/permissions.request?app_id=id&perms=email. The TokenResponse is also an HTTPS redi-
rect back to Pinterest, of the form: https://pinterest.com/#access_token=token. Note that the
access token is passed as a fragment URI. JavaScript running on behalf of the client can extract
the token and then pass it to the client when necessary. In practice, these HTTP exchanges are
implemented by a JavaScript SDK provided by Facebook and embedded into Pinterest, hence
messages may have additional Facebook-specific parameters, but generally follow this pattern.
3.2 Authorization Code Flow
The Authorization Code flow (Figure 4), also called Explicit Grant flow or Web Server flow, can
be used by client websites wishing to implement a deeper social integration with the resource
server by using server-side API calls. It requires that the client must have a security association
with the authorization server, using for example a shared secret. Moreover, it requires that the
access token be retrieved on the server-side by the client. The motivation for this is two-fold:
(i) it allows the authorization server to authenticate the client’s token request using a secret
that only the client and the server know. In contrast, the authorization server in the user-agent
flow has no way to ensure that the client in fact wanted a token to be issued, it simply sends
a token to the client’s HTTPS endpoint; (ii) it prevents the access token from passing through
the browser, and hence ensures that only the client application may access the resource server
directly. In contrast, the access token in the user-agent flow may be leaked in the Referer header,
browser history, or by malicious third-party JavaScript running on the client.
The authorization flow is depicted in Figure 3. Let the client at URL C have both an
application identifier id and a secret sec pre-registered at AS. The difference between the web
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server and user-agent flows begins after the SocialLogin step, and ends before the APIRequest step:
3. CodeRequest(C,b,AS,id,perms): C redirects b to AS requesting authorization for id with perms.
4. Authorize(RO,b,sid,C,perms): AS looks up id and asks RO for authorization; RO using browser
b in session sid at AS authorizes C with perms.
5. CodeResponse(AS,b,C,code): AS redirects b back to C with an authorization code.
5.1) APITokenRequest(C,AS,code,id,sec): C makes an API request for an access token to AS with
code, id, and sec.
5.2) APITokenResponse(AS,C,token): AS checks id and sec, verifies the code and returns a token to
C.
3.3 Additional Protocol Parameters
In addition to the basic protocol flows outlined above, OAuth 2.0 enables several other optional
features. Our models capture the following:
Redirection URI. Whenever a client sends a message to the authorization server, it may optionally
provide a redirect uri parameter, where it wants the response to be sent. In particular, the
TokenRequest and CodeRequest messages above may include this parameter, and if they do, then the
corresponding APITokenRequest must also include it. The client may thus ask for the authorization
server to redirect the browser to the same page (or state) from which the authorization request
was issued. Since the security of OAuth crucially depends on the URI where codes and tokens
are sent, the specification strongly advises that clients must register all their potential redirection
URIs beforehand at the authorization server. If not, it predicts attacks where a malicious website
may be able to acquire codes or tokens and break the security of the protocol. Indeed, our analysis
found such attacks both in our model and in real websites. We call such attacks Token Redirection
attacks.
State Parameter. After the TokenRequest or CodeRequest steps above, the client waits for the
authorization server to send a response. The client has no way of authenticating this response,
so a malicious website can fool the resource owner into sending the client a different authorization
code or access token (belonging to a different user). This is a variation of the standard website
login CSRF attack that we call a Social Login CSRF attack. To prevent this attack, the OAuth
specification recommends that clients generate a nonce that is strongly bound to the resource
owner’s session at the client (say, by hashing a cookie). It should then pass this nonce as an
additional state parameter in the CodeRequest or TokenRequest messages. The authorization server
simply returns this parameter in its response, and by checking that the two match, the client
can verify that the returned token or code is meant for the current session.







Our analysis does not cover other features of OAuth, such as refresh tokens, token and code
expiry, the right use of permissions, or the other protocol flows described in the specification.
We leave these features for future work.
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3.4 A Threat Model for OAuth 2.0
The OAuth specification [33] and a companion document describing its threat model [35] together
provide an exhaustive list of potential threats to the protocol. We consider a subset of these
threats in our formal analysis.
The ultimate aim of the attackers we consider is to steal or modify the private information of
an honest resource owner, for example by fooling honest or buggy clients, authorization servers,
or resource owners into divulging this information. To this end, we consider: network based
attackers who can sniff, intercept, and inject messages into insecure HTTP traffic; malicious
clients, resource owners, and authorization servers; malicious websites that honest resource own-
ers may browse to; and honest clients with specific web vulnerabilities, such as CSRF attacks,
or redirectors that may forward HTTP requests to malicious websites.
We do not explicitly consider attacks on the browser or operating system of honest partic-
ipants; instead, we treat such participants as compromised, that is, as fully controlled by an
attacker. We assume that honest resource owners choose strong passwords and use secure web
browsers. We assume that honest authorization servers have no web vulnerabilities, instead we
focus on vulnerabilities in client websites.
3.5 Security Goals for OAuth 2.0
We describe the security goals for each participant by defining Datalog-like authorization poli-
cies [24] that must be satisfied at different stages of the protocol. The policy A : B,C is read as
“A if B and C”.
The resource owner RO (using browser b) in a session sid’ with a client C has successfully
completed the social sign-on with authorization server AS (and resource server RS) if it intended
to sign into the client, if it agreed to authorize the client, and if the client and resource owner






The authorization server must ensure that a token is issued only to authorized clients. Its
policy for the user-agent flow says that a TokenResponse can only be sent to C if the resource






Note that we do not require a TokenResponse to be only issued in response to a TokenRequest from
the client: at this stage, the user-agent flow has not authenticated the client, and so cannot know
whether the client intended to request a token.









From the viewpoint of the resource server, every API call must be issued by an authorized





Finally, from the viewpoint of the client, the social sign-on has completed successfully if it
has correctly identified the resource owner currently visiting its page, and obtained an access





4 The WebSpi library and its usage
Various calculi, starting from the spi-calculus [5], have been remarkably successful as modeling
languages for cryptographic protocols, thanks also to the emergence of automated verification
tools that can analyze large protocol models. Following in this tradition, we model web security
mechanisms in an applied pi-calculus [3, 4], and verify them using ProVerif [16]. We identify a
set of idioms that are particularly useful in modeling web applications and web-based attackers,
and offer them as a library, called WebSpi, available to other developers of web models.
4.1 ProVerif
The ProVerif specification language is a variant of the applied pi-calculus, an operational model
of communicating concurrent processes with a flexible sublanguage for describing data structures
and functional computation. Below, we summarize the ProVerif specification language and its
verification methodology, to the extent used in this paper. We refer the reader to [18, 16] for
further details on ProVerif.
4.1.1 Messages
Basic types are channels, bitstrings or user-defined. Atomic messages, typically ranged over
by a,b,c,h,k,... are tokens of basic types. Messages can be composed by pairing (M,N) or by
applying n-ary data constructors and destructors f(M1,...,Mn). Constructors and destructors are
particularly useful for cryptography, as described below. Pattern matching is extensively used





f(M1,...,Mn) constructor or destructor f applied to M1,...,Mn
=M matching operator
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4.1.2 Cryptography
ProVerif models symbolic cryptography: cryptographic algorithms are treated as perfect black-
boxes whose properties are abstractly encoded using constructors (introduced by the fun keyword)
and destructors (introduced by the reduc keyword). As an example, consider authenticated
encryption:
fun aenc(bitstring,symkey): bitstring.
reduc forall b:bitstring,k:symkey; adec(aenc(b,k),k) = b.
Given a bit-string b and a symmetric key k, the term aenc(b,k) stands for the bitstring obtained
by encrypting b under k. The destructor adec, given an authenticated encryption and the original
symmetric key, evaluates to the original bit-string b.
ProVerif constructors are collision-free (one-one) functions and are only reversible if equipped
with a corresponding destructor. Hence, MACs and hashes are modeled as irreversible construc-




reduc forall k:symkey,dk:privkey; unwrap(wrap(k,pk(dk)),dk) = k.
fun sign(bitstring,privkey): bitstring.
reduc forall b:bitstring,sk:privkey; verify(sign(b,sk),pk(sk)) = b.
These and other standard cryptographic operations are part of the ProVerif library. Users
can define other primitives when necessary. Such primitives can be used for example to build
detailed models of protocols like TLS [13].
4.1.3 Protocol Processes
The syntax of ProVerif’s specification language, given below, is mostly standard compared to
other process algebra. Messages may be sent and received on channels, or stored and retrieved
from tables (which themselves are internally encoded by private channels). Fresh messages (such
as nonces) are generated using new. Pattern matching is used to parse messages in let, but also
when receiving messages from channels or tables. Predicates p(M) are invoked in conditionals
(boolean conditions M=N are a special case). Finally, processes can be run in parallel, and even
replicated.
P,Q ::= process
out(a,M);P send M on channel a
in(a,X);P receive message in X
insert(t,M);P insert M into table t
get(t,X) in P retrieve table entry in X
new a;P fresh name with scope P
event e(M1,...,Mn);P insert event in trace
let X=M in P pattern matching
if p(M) then P else Q conditional statement
P|Q run P and Q in parallel
!P run unbounded number of copies of P in parallel
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4.1.4 Security Queries
The command event e(M1,...,Mn) inserts an event e(M1,...,Mn) in the trace of the process being
executed. Such events form the basis of the verification model of ProVerif. A script in fact
contains processes and queries of the form
∀M1, ...Mk. e(M1, ...Mk) ⇒ φ
The tool tries to prove that whenever the event e is reachable, the formula φ is true (φ can
contain conjunctions or disjunctions).
A common case is that of correspondence assertions [48], where an event e is split into two
sub-events begine and ende. The goal is to show that if ende is reachable then begine must have
been reached beforehand. The corresponding ProVerif query is
query M1:T1,...,Mn:Tn; End(e,M1,...Mn) =⇒Begin(e,M1,...,Mn).
Correspondence queries naturally encode authentication goals, as noted in Section 4.1.5. Syn-
tactic secrecy goals are encoded as reachability queries on the attacker’s knowledge.
4.1.5 Distributed security policies
Since their introduction in the context of the spi-calculus [28], Datalog-like security policies have
proven to be an ideal tool to describe enforceable authorization and authentication policies for
distributed security protocols. A program statement such as Assume(UserSends(u,m)) adds to a
global knowledge base the fact that user u has sent message m. Such a statement should precede
the actual code used by the user to send the message, and its purpose it to reflect the operation
in the policy world. A program statement such as Expect(ServerAuthorizes(s,u,d)) instead means
that at this point in the code, we must be able to prove that the server s is willing to authorize
user u to retrieve data d. The main idea is that the Expect triggers a query on the security policy,
using the facts known (and assumed) so far. In this paper, we adopt a similar style to express
our policies and bind them to protocol code.
Using ProVerif’s native support for predicates defined by Horn clauses, we embed the assump-
tion of fact e by the code if Assume(e) then P, where Assume is declared as a blocking predicate,
so that ProVerif treats Assume(e) as an atomic fact and adds it as a hypothesis in its proof
derivations about P. Conversely, the expectation that e holds is written as event Expect(e). Se-
curity policies are defined as Horn clauses extending a predicate fact. In particular, the WebSpi
library includes the generic clause forall e:Fact; Assume(e) →fact(e) that admits assumed facts,
and a generic security query forall e:Fact; event(Expect(e)) =⇒fact(e) that requires every expected
predicate to be provable from the policy and previously assumed facts.
Moreover, inspired by Binder [24, 6], we encode the standard Says modality axiomatized
below:
forall p:Principal,e:Fact; fact(e) →fact(Says(p,e));
forall p:Principal,e:Fact; fact(Compromised(p)) →fact(Says(p,e)).
The two rules state that if a fact is true, it can be assumed to be said by any principal, and that
if a principal is known to be compromised, denoted by the fact Compromised(p), then it cannot
be trusted anymore and is ready to say anything.
Distributed authorization policies have already been used for typed-based verification of pro-
tocols in the applied pi-calculus [27]. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to embed
them on top of ProVerif predicates, thus driving the verification of realistic case studies.
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Figure 5: WebSpi architectural diagram.
4.1.6 Verification
ProVerif translates applied-pi processes into Horn clauses in order to perform automatic verifi-
cation. The main soundness theorem in [17] guarantees that if ProVerif says that a query is true
for a given script, then it is in fact the case that the query is true on all traces of the applied-pi
processes defined in the script in parallel with any other arbitrary attacker processes. If a query
is false, ProVerif produces a proof derivation that shows how an attacker may be able to trigger
an event that violates the query. In some cases, ProVerif can even extract a step-by-step attack
trace.
General cryptographic protocol verification is undecidable, hence ProVerif does not always
terminate. ProVerif uses conservative abstractions that let it analyze protocol instances for
an unbounded number of participants, sessions, and attackers, but may report false positives.
Hence, one needs to validate proof derivations and formal attack traces before accepting them
as counterexamples on a model.
4.2 WebSpi
WebSpi models consist of users who surf the Internet on web browsers, in order to interact with
web applications that are hosted by web servers. A user can use multiple browsers, and a server
can host multiple web applications. Figure 5 gives a schematic representation of the model.
4.2.1 Principals, HTTP Protocol, Browsers, and Servers
The agents in our model are called principals. They can play the role of users or owners of web
applications. Hence, the same principal may own two different web applications and be the user
of a third one. Users hold credentials to authenticate with respect to a specific web application
(identified by a host domain and subdomain) in the table credentials. Web applications hold
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These tables are private to the model and represent a pre-existing distribution of secrets (pass-
words and keys). They are populated by the process CredentialFactory that provides an API for
the attacker (explained later) to create an arbitrary population of principals, and compromise
some of them.
Browsers and servers communicate using the HTTP(S) protocol over a channel net. Our




denotes a regular (non-AJAX) HTTP GET request with cookies. Cookies can be associated to the
root “” of a domain or to a specific path, and support HttpOnly and Secure attributes. The
standardized, application-independent behavior of browsers and servers, which includes TLS
connection and cookie handling, is modeled by the processes HttpClient and HttpServer. These
processes incorporate a simple model of anonymous HTTP(S) connections: each request to an
HTTPS URI is encrypted with a fresh symmetric key, that is in turn encrypted under the server’s
public key. The response is encrypted with the same symmetric key.
HTTP Server. The process HttpServer simply handles the TLS connections on behalf of a web
application (Section 4.2.2), and is reported below.
let HttpServer() =
in(net,(b:Browser,o:Origin,m:bitstring));
get serverIdentities(=originhost(o),pr,pk P,sk P,xdrp) in
let (k:symkey,httpReq(u,hs,req)) = reqdec(o,m,sk P) in
if origin(u) = o then




The HTTP(S) server accepts requests over channel net, from browser b, on behalf of the web
application hosted from the destination origin o. If TLS is used, it decodes the message m to
obtain the session key k and the actual request httpReq(u,hs,req). If the connection was plain
HTTP, reqdec becomes the identity function on m.
Next, the server forwards the request to the corresponding web application on channel
httpServerRequest, waiting for a response to encrypt (if necessary) and forward on the net back to
b. Since the server may act on behalf of several applications, the token corr is used to correlate the
right request/response pairs between the HTTP server process and the various web application
processes. Server-side sessions, are maintained by individual web applications and are not visible
at this stage.
HTTP Client. The process HttpClient is the core of the WebSpi library. It represent the behavior
of a specific browser b, handling raw network requests and TLS encryption, offering to user
processes an API for surfing the web, and modeling page origins and persistent state (cookies
and local storage).
The browser API sends messages to the local channel internalRequest to a sub-process which
handles network messages and TLS in a complementary fashion to the HTTP server process.
This module also handles cookies, AJAX and cross-domain requests. The code below shows the
final stages of handling an HTTP response.
(let httpOk(dataIn) = resp in
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if p = aboutBlank() then




(if aj = ajax() then
(get pageOrigin(=p,oldorig,oldh,olduri) in
if (foo = xdr() || oldorig = o) then
out (ajaxResponse(b),(p,u,dataIn)))))
|(let httpRedirect(redir) = resp in
out (internalRequest(b),(redir,httpGet(),ref,p,notajax()))))
)
An OK response originated by clicking on a link, submitting a form, or editing the address bar
to URI u, leads to the creation of a new page p1, a corresponding update in the page origin table,
and a message on the newPage channel of browser b which corresponds to loading the HTML
payload dataIn in the new page. An OK response originated by an AJAX call to the same origin
oldorig, or to a server accepting cross-domain requests (flag xdr()) instead leaves the old page in
place and creates a message on the ajaxResponse channel of b that makes the AJAX payload dataIn
available to the page. A Redirection response, which is not allowed for an AJAX request, is
handled by issuing a fresh request on the internalRequest channel.
The browser API includes commands browserRequest modelling a navigation request originat-
ing from the address bar or bookmarks (with an empty Referer header), pageClick modelling
a navigation request or form submission from within a page (either caused by the user or by
JavaScript), ajaxRequest to initiate an XMLHttpRequest and setCookieStorage to update the non-
HttpOnly cookies from JavaScript.
Nondeterministically, the browser may reset the cookies and local storage for a given origin
(modeling the user clearing the cookie cache) or release cookies/storage associated to a given







Cookies are indexed by origin and by path (where slash() stands for the empty path).
Predefined processes. For convenience, the WebSpi library contains a number of predefined
processes that implement useful patterns of behaviour on the web. To cite some representative
examples, the HttpRedirector process provides a simple, predefined redirection service. The process
WebSurfer models a generic user principal who is willing to browse the web to any public URL.
Process UntrustedApp implements a simple web application that can be compromised by the
attacker, and is useful to test the robustness of a protocol with respect to compromise of third
parties.
4.2.2 Modeling web applications using WebSpi
To model a web application using WebSpi, one typically writes three processes:
1In the case of cookies, we give access also to pages loaded from a sub-origin (we check for =originhost(o)),
since a page from sub.example.com can upcast its origin to example.com, and read the corresponding cookies.
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 a server-side (PHP-like) process representing the website, which interfaces with HttpServer
to handle network communications;
 a client-side (JavaScript-like) process representing the web page, which interfaces with the
browsing API exposed by HttpClient;
 a user process representing the behavior of a human who uses a browser to access the web
application, clicking on links, filling forms and so on.
In some simple cases, the second and third process may be combined. In addition to messag-
ing over HTTP(S), client and server-side processes may perform for example cryptographic or
database operations.
4.2.3 Example: login application
As an example, we show how to model and analyze the core functionality of a typical website
login application, which is a building block of the OAuth models considered in this paper.
Login user process. Assume that user p, who controls browser b, has requested the login page
of the web application at h. The process LoginUSerAgent below waits for the response on the
newPage(b) channel, which b uses to forward the parsed HTTP response. We model a careful
user, that checks that the protocol used is HTTPS and that the page came from the correct
host h, avoiding phishing attacks. (We consider careless users to be compromised, that is under
the control of the attacker.) If the page contains a form, the user retrieves her credentials and
enters them in the loginFormReply which is embedded in a POST message to be forwarded to the
browser on channel pageClick. If the credentials were the right ones for the user, the server will
reply a second time (triggering a new instance of LoginUSerAgent) with a loginSuccess page, and
the user is participating in a valid session.
let LoginUserAgent(b:Browser) =
let p = principal(b) in
in(newPage(b),(p1:Page, u:Uri, d:bitstring));
let (=https(), h:Host, loginPath(app)) = (protocol(u),host(u),path(u)) in
((





if loginSuccess() = d then
event Expect(ValidSession(p,b,h)))
)).
Both the statements assume(Login(p,b,h,uId)) and Expect(ValidSession(p,b,h)) are part of the security
specification. The former states that the user p intends to log in as the user uId at the web
application h, using the browser b. The latter indicates that at this stage the user demands to
be logged in to the right website.
Login server process. We model the server-side login application as follows:
let LoginApp(h:Host,app:Path) =
in(httpServerRequest,(u:Uri,hs:Headers,req:HttpRequest,corr:bitstring));
let uri(=https(),=h,=loginPath(app),q) = u in
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let c = getCookie(hs) in
let cookiePair(sid,ch) = c in






The server receives parsed web requests from HttpServer on channel httpServerRequest, which
is shared between all server-side applications. It first checks that the request was addressed
to the login application over HTTPS. It then parses the headers to extract the session cookie,
and parses the request body to obtain the login form containing uId and pwd. It retrieves the
credentials of the user uId and checks the validity of the password pwd to authenticate the user. If
these checks succeed, the application registers a new server session for the user by the command
insert serverSessions(h,sid,uId); if any check fails, it silently rejects the request; otherwise it returns
a page loginSuccess().
Before registering the session, the policy event Expect(LoginAuthorized(sp,h,uId,sid)) is triggered
to signal the user uId has logged in with the session sid on h.
Security goals. The security goals for the login protocol are written as policies that define when
the predicates LoginAuthorized and ValidSession hold. For clarity, we write policies in Datalog style
(in ProVerif syntax, they are written right-to-left as clauses that extend the fact predicate).
From the viewpoint of the server, the login protocol has a simple authentication goal: a user
should be logged in only if the user intended to log in to that server in the first place. We can





where up and sp are respectively the user and server principals. The last line of the policy
accounts for the possibility that the user may have been compromised (that is, her password
may be known to that adversary.)
From the viewpoint of the browser, login has successfully completed if the server has logged






These policies can be read as the standard correspondence assertions [48] typically used to
specify authentication properties in cryptographic protocols. However, using predicates, we can
also encode more intuitive authorization policies that would generally be difficult to encode as
ProVerif queries.
4.2.4 A customizable attacker model
We consider a standard symbolic active (Dolev-Yao) attacker who controls all public channels
and some principals, but cannot guess secrets or access private channels. Furthermore, the
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Principals
createServer(sp) create a new server for principal sp
createUser(up,h,p) create a new user up for the app at path p on host h
compromiseUser(id,h,p) force user with login id on app p at h to reveal its password
compromiseServer(h) force principal of server hosted at h to reveal its secret key
Network
injectMessage(e1,e2,m) send message m to endpoint e2 as if it came from e1
interceptMessage(e1,e2) intercept a message from e1 to e2
Websites
startUntrustedApp(h,p) start a malicious application p at h
getServerRequest(h,p) intercept a request between the http module and app p at h
sendServerResponse(h,p,u,r,c,m) send m to u on behalf of h, p, with cookie c and
HTTP response type r, from the server with principal sp
httpRequestResponse(c,u,m) send m to u and wait for response
JavaScript
getClientResponse(b,h,p) intercept the response from browser b to app h, p
sendClientRequest(b,h,p,c,u1,u2,m) send m to h, p as if b clicked on u1 on a page from u2
Table 1: A command API for the active web attacker
attacker can create new data and can encrypt or decrypt any message for which it has obtained
the cryptographic key, but otherwise cannot break cryptography.
By default, all the channels, tables, and credentials used in WebSpi are private. We define
a process AttackerProxy that mediates the attacker’s access to these resources, based on a set
a configuration flags. The attacker executes a command by sending a message on the public
channel admin and if the current configuration allows it, the process executes the command and
returns the result (if any) on the public channel result:
let AttackerProxy() =
in (pub,x:Command);




The full list of commands that the attacker can send is listed in Table 1. This API is designed
to be operational : each command corresponds to a concrete attack that can be mounted on a
real web interaction. It includes three categories of attacker capabilities:
Managing principals. The first two commands (enabled by the flag NetworkSetup) allow the at-
tacker to set up an arbitrary population of user and server principals by populating the credentials
and serverIdentities tables. If these commands are disabled, the model developer must create his
own topology of users and servers. The third and fourth command (enabled by flags MaliciousUsers,
MaliciousServers) allow the attacker to obtain the credentials of a selected user or server.
Network attackers. The next two commands (enabled by the flag NetworkAttackers) allow the
attacker to intercept and inject arbitrary messages into a connection between any two endpoints.
Hence, the attacker can alter the cookies of an HTTP request, but cannot read the (decrypted)
content of an HTTPS message.
Malicious websites. The next four commands (enabled by UntrustedWebsites) give the attacker
an API to build web applications and deploy them (on top of HttpServer) at a given endpoint,
potentially on a honest server. This API gives the attacker fewer capabilities than he would have
on a compromised server, but is more realistic, and allows us to discover interesting website-based
(PHP) attacks.
Malicious JavaScript. The last two commands (enabled by UntrustedJavaScript) provide the at-
tacker with an API to access features from the browsers’ HttpClient, to simulate some of the
capabilities of JavaScript code downloaded from untrusted websites.
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4.3 From ProVerif results to concrete web attacks
When analyzing a web application model built on top of WebSpi, the model developer may
fine-tune the attacker model by setting various flags and then run ProVerif to discover attacks
of interest. ProVerif will either prove the model correct (with respect to its security goals), or
fail to verify the model, or not terminate.
If verification succeeds, the correctness theorem for ProVerif [17] guarantees that no attacks
exist, at least among the class of attacks considered in the model. We note, however, that this
positive result is of limited value, since although WebSpi is quite expressive and extensible, it
is not a complete model of the web. For example, it does not cover many browser and server
features, such as the treatment of advanced HTTP headers such as Origin and ETag. Hence,
our main focus is on discovering attacks, which can be validated in the real world, rather than
on providing positive guarantees, which may be violated in practice due to omissions from the
model.
When verification fails, ProVerif sometimes produces an attack trace, or else it provides a
proof derivation that hints towards a potential attack. Because of the way our attacker model
is designed, all attacker actions in traces and derivations appear as concrete commands and
responses on the admin and result channels. This makes it possible to filter the ProVerif output to
extract formal attacker processes that can sometimes be translated into real-world web attacks.
As an example, we analyze our WebSpi model of the login application against its two security
policies, and explore its robustness against different categories of attackers. Our results are
summarized at the beginning of Tables 2 and 4.
If we only enable network attackers, malicious users, and malicious servers, ProVerif proves
the model secure. Suppose we relax the LoginUserAgent process so that naive users may also agree
to login over HTTP. ProVerif then finds a network-based password-sniffing attack that breaks
both policies.
If we also enable malicious websites, ProVerif finds a standard login CSRF attack. Our login
forms, much like the Twitter login form, do not include any unguessable values. So a malicious
website that also controls a malicious user Eve can fool an honest user Alice into logging in as
Eve. Let us see how we can reconstruct this attack.
In this case, ProVerif produces a proof derivation, but not an attack trace. Such derivations
can be very long, since they list all attempted attacks, ending in the successful one, and they
explain how the attacker constructed each message. For our example, the derivation has 3568
steps. However, if we select just the messages on the admin and result channels, we end up
with a derivation of 89 steps. Most of the steps towards the beginning of this derivation are
redundant commands that are easy to identify and discard. Starting from the end, we can
optimize the derivation by hand to finally obtain an attack in 7 steps (a time-consuming but
rewarding process).
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If ProVerif can find the attack again using just this attacker process, disabling all other attackers
(by setting attacker mode to passive), then we say that the attack is concrete.
Finally, we attempt to execute the attack on a real website. We rewrite the process above
as a PHP script and, indeed, we find that a login CSRF attack can be mounted on the Twitter
login page. This attack was known to exist, but as we show in the following section, it can be
used to build new login CSRF attacks on Twitter clients.
5 Analyzing OAuth 2.0 using ProVerif
Following the pattern of the Login example in the previous section, we build models for two pro-
tocol configurations of the OAuth protocol using the WebSpi library, and analyze their security
properties.
5.1 OAuth 2.0 model
We consider an unbounded number of users and servers. Each user is willing to browse any
website (whether trusted or malicious) but only sends secret data to trusted sites. Each server
may host one or more of the applications described below.
Login: As shown in Section 4, this application consists of a server process LoginApp and a cor-
responding user-agent process LoginUserAgent that together model form-based login for websites.
In our model, both OAuth authorization servers and their client websites host login applications.
Data Server: An application that models resource servers. It includes a server process DataServerApp
that offers an API with two functions: getData retrieves all the data for a particular user, and
storeData stores new data for a user. We treat getId as a special case of getData where the caller is
only interested in the user’s identity. Users logged in locally on the resource server (through its
LoginApp) may access their data through a browser, and their behavior is modeled by a user-agent
process DataServerUserAgent. OAuth clients may remotely access data on behalf of their social
login users, by presenting an access token.
OAuth Authorization (UserAgent Flow): A three-party social web application that models the
user-agent flow of the OAuth protocol. The process OAuthImplicitServerApp models authorization
servers, and the process OAuthUserAgent models resource owners. These processes closely follow
the protocol flow described in Section 3. The process OAuthImplicitClientApp models clients that
offer social login; it offers a social login form for resource owners to click on to initiate social
sign-on. When sign-on is completed, it provides the resource owner with additional forms to get
and store data from the resource server. These additional data actions are not explicitly covered
by the OAuth protocol, but are a natural consequence of its use.
OAuth Authorization (Authorization Code Flow): A three-party social web application that mod-
els the authorization code flow of the OAuth protocol, as described in Section 3. The process
OAuthExplicitClientApp models clients and OAuthExplicitServerApp models authorization servers.
We elide details of the ProVerif code for these applications, except to note that they are built
on top of the library processes HttpClient and HttpServer, much like the login application, and
implement message exchanges as described in the protocol. Each process includes Assume and
Expect statements that track the security events of the protocol. For example, the OAuthUserAgent
process assumes the predicate SocialLogin(RO,b,sid,C,AS,RS) before sending the social login form
to the client; after login is completed it expects the predicate SocialLoginDone(RO,b,sid,C,u,AS,RS).
We then encode the security goals of Section 3 as clauses defining such predicates. The full script
is available online [11].
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Model Lines Verification Time
WebSpi Library 463
Login Application 122 5s
Login with JavaScript Password Hash 124 5s
+ Data Server Application 131 41s
+ OAuth User-Agent Flow 180 1h12m
+ OAuth Authorization Code Flow 52 2h56m
Total (including attacks) 1245
Table 2: Protocol Models Verified with ProVerif
5.2 Results of the ProVerif analysis
We analyze the security of different configurations of our OAuth model using ProVerif. Table 2
summarizes our positive verification results. Each line lists a part of the model, the number
of lines of ProVerif code, and the time taken to verify them. The most general model for
which we were able to obtain positive results verifies OAuth in both explicit and implicit grant
modes against network attackers, malicious resource owners and clients, untrusted websites and
JavaScript. However, we assume that each client has exactly one authorization server, every
authorization server is honest, all exchanges are over HTTPS, and no web vulnerabilities exists
on honest servers, that is, clients and authorization servers do not host HTTP redirectors and
protect all their forms against login and data CSRF attacks. Under these conditions, ProVerif
is unable to find any attacks, even considering an unbounded number of sessions. This should
not be interpreted as a definitive proof of security, since we model only a subset of OAuth
configurations and our web model is not complete.
Under other attacker configurations, ProVerif finds protocol traces that violate the security
goals. Table 4 summarizes the attacks found by ProVerif. In each case, we were able to extract
attacker processes (as we did for the login application of Section 4). In Appendix A we provide
processes for some of these attacks.
These formal attacks led to our discovery of concrete, previously unknown attacks involving
Facebook, Twitter, Yahoo, IMDB, Bitly and several other popular websites. We focused on
websites on which we quickly found vulnerabilities. Other websites may also be vulnerable to
these or related attacks. Table 5 in Appendix A summarizes our website attacks. The rest of
this section describes and discusses these attacks.
Going from the formal counterexamples of ProVerif in Table 4 to the concrete website attacks
of Table 5 involved several steps. First we analysed the ProVerif traces to extract the short
attacker processes of Appendix A, as illustrated in Section 4 for the login application. Then we
collected normal web traces using the TamperData extension for Firefox. By running a script
on these traces, we collected client and authorization server login URIs, CSRF vulnerable forms,
and client application identifiers. Using this data, we wrote website attackers in a combination of
PHP and JavaScript and examined an arbitrary selection of OAuth 2.0 clients and authorization
servers. Many of these steps can be automated; for example, AUTHSCAN [29] shows how
to heuristically extract concrete attacks from ProVerif counterexamples produced by WebSpi
models.
5.3 Social CSRF attacks against OAuth 2.0
To begin with, we note that if any of the exchanges of our OAuth model is allowed over un-
encrypted HTTP, ProVerif immediately finds a network-based attack that breaks our security
goals, either by stealing the password or access token, or by injecting a forged request or re-
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sponse. In the rest of this paper, we will ignore such well-known attack vectors and look for
more interesting attacks. We first consider Social CSRF attacks.
To better understand these attacks, recall the the typical OAuth protocol flow involves four
forms where the user interacts with the protocol: the login form at the authorization server, the
social login form (“Login with Facebook”) at the client, the authorization form at the authoriza-
tion server, and (potentially) a data entry (comment) form at the client. When the user submits
(clicks on) any of these forms, an HTTP GET or POST request is sent to a form action URI,
along with the parameters encoded in the form. If, however, there is no CSRF protection at this
action URI, e.g. a session-specific secret token in the form parameters, a malicious website may
directly send a user to the action URI without the user ever agreeing to submit the form, leading
to various kinds of CSRF attacks that may break the user’s authentication or authorization goals.
We identify several conditions under which OAuth 2.0 deployments are vulnerable to Social
CSRF attacks. In our models, such attacks appear in two forms: either the network attacker
injects an HTTP response which redirects the user to a carefully crafted URI, or a malicious
website entices the user into clicking on a URL or submit button.
Automatic Login CSRF. Suppose the social login form has no CSRF protection. As described
in Section 2, this is true for many OAuth clients, such as CitySearch. Then, a malicious website
can effectively bypass the SocialLogin step of the protocol and directly redirect the user’s browser
to the TokenRequest or CodeRequest step. If the authorization server then silently authorizes the
token release, say because the user is logged in and has previously authorized this client, then the
protocol can proceed to completion without any interaction with the user. Hence, a malicious
website can cause the resource owner to log in to CitySearch (through Facebook) even if she did
not wish to. We call this an automatic login CSRF, and it is widespread among OAuth clients
(see Table 5).
In our model, ProVerif finds this attack on both OAuth flows, as a violation of the SocialLoginAccept
policy on our model. It demonstrates a trace where it is possible for the OAuth client process
to execute the event SocialLoginAccept even though this resource owner never previously executed
SocialLogin. The trace also violate the user’s SocialLoginDone policy. This is an interesting example
of how a seemingly innocuous vulnerability in the client website can lead to the failure of the
expected security goals of an honest user, who may simply have wished to remain anonymous.
Social Login CSRF through AS Login CSRF. Suppose the login form on the authorization server
is not protected against login CSRF. This is the case for Twitter, as described in Section 4.3.
In this case, a malicious website can bypass the Login step of the protocol and directly pass his
own credentials to the login form’s action URI. Hence, the user’s browser will be silently logged
into the attacker’s Twitter account. Furthermore, if the user ever clicks on “Login with Twitter”
on any client website, he will be logged into that website also as the attacker, resulting in a
social login CSRF attack. All future actions by the user (such as commenting on a blog) will be
credited to the attacker’s identity. We confirmed this attack on Twitter client websites such as
WordPress.
In our model, ProVerif finds a violation of the user’s SocialLoginDone policy; the browser com-
pletes social sign-on for one user but the client website has accepted the login (SocialLoginAccept)
for a different user in the same session. This is an example where a flaw in a single authorization
server can be amplified to affect all its clients.
Social Login CSRF on stateless clients. Suppose an OAuth client does not implement the optional
state parameter. Then it is subject to a second kind of social login CSRF attack, as predicted
by the OAuth specification. A malicious user (in concert with a malicious website) can inject
his own TokenResponse in place of an honest resource owner’s TokenResponse in step 5 of the user-
agent flow, by redirecting the user to the corresponding URI. (In the authorization code flow, the
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malicious user injects her CodeResponse instead.) When the client receives this response, it has
no way of knowing that it was issued for a different user in response to a different TokenRequest.
Many OAuth clients, such as IMDB, do not implement the state parameter and are vulnerable
to this attack.
ProVerif again finds a trace that violates SocialLoginDone; the browser and client have incon-
sistent views on the identity of the logged-in user.
Social Sharing CSRF. Once social sign-on is complete, the client has an access token that it can
use to read, and sometimes write, user data on the resource server. Suppose a form that the client
uses to accept user data is not protected against CSRF; then this vulnerability may be amplified
to a CSRF attack on the resource server. For example, as described in Section 2, the review
forms on CitySearch are not protected against regular CSRF attacks, and data entered in these
forms is automatically cross-posted on Facebook. Hence, a malicious website can post arbitrary
reviews in the name of an honest resource owner, and this form will be stored on Facebook, even
though the resource owner never intended to fill in the form, and despite Facebook’s own careful
CSRF protections.
ProVerif finds this attack on both OAuth flows, as a violation of the APIRequest policy at
the client. It demonstrates a trace where a malicious website causes the client process to send a
storeData API request, even though the resource owner never asked for any data to be stored.
5.4 Token stealing attacks against OAuth 2.0
We identify three conditions under which OAuth 2.0 deployments are vulnerable to access token
and authorization code redirection, leading to serious attacks such as unauthorized login on the
client and user data theft on the resource server. All of these attacks rely on the existence of
an attacker-controlled URIs on the client website, and on the authorization server’s willingness
to issue authorization codes and access tokens to these URIs. The policy that an authorization
server uses to match a given redirect uri to a registered client is implementation-specific. For
example, Facebook and Live identify clients by a domain, and are willing to issue tokens to any
URI on that domain. This gives clients maximum flexibility in terms of the pages where they
can embed social login. Conversely, it substantially increases the attack surface. As we shall see,
any untrusted page within this URI range can lead to serious attacks.
Unauthorized Login by Authentication Code Redirection. Suppose a client website hosts an HTTP
Redirector that forwards all GET requests to an attacker’s website. Then any browser that visits
this URI will be forwarded to the attacker’s webpage, and the browser will automatically also
attach any parameters in the original URI, such as the authorization code, as a parameter to
the redirected URI. We found such redirectors on multiple websites, including on WordPress as
described below.
Notably, if the HTTP redirector is a valid redirect uri for the authorization server, a malicious
website can perform a triple-redirection attack to steal the authorization code: (1) it redirects
the user to the authorization server to request a code (CodeRequest) but with the redirect uri set
to the HTTP redirector; (2) the authorization server redirects the browser to the redirect uri
with the authorization code as parameter (CodeResponse); (3) the redirector sends the browser
to the attacker’s website with the authorization code as parameter. Once it has obtained the
authorization code, the website can impersonate the resource owner at the client website by using
social login again but using its own browser. This time, when the client sends a CodeRequest,
the malicious browser does not contact the authorization server; instead it returns the stolen
authorization code in a CodeResponse. When the client subsequently verifies this code (using
APITokenRequest) it will be given the identity of the honest resource owner, not the attacker,
completely breaking the authentication goal of social sign-on.
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In our model, ProVerif finds this attack as a violation of the SocialLoginAccept policy; the client
completes social login for a user even though the user never executed Login with this browser;
the browser in fact belongs to the attacker.
To see an example of the attack flow, consider the Facebook client WordPress. Suppose
the attacker has a blog on WordPress. For a fee, WordPress allows its members to forward
all traffic sent to their blog to an external website. Hence, the attacker can set up an HTTP
redirector at eve.wordpress.com. When a resource owner tries to log in to someblog.wordpress.com
using Facebook, she is redirected to Facebook and then back with the authorization code to
someblog.wordpress.com/connect/?code=C. However, Facebook is willing to redirect this code to
any URL of the form *.wordpress.com/* because the domain registered for the WordPress client at
Facebook is just wordpress.com. So, to execute our attack, a malicious website redirects the honest
resource owner to Facebook with the redirection uri eve.wordpress.com, and the authorization
code will be redirected back to the website. We note that this attack is not prevented by using
a state parameter at the client, since the real client never sees the authorization code.
Resource Theft by Access Token Redirection. If an OAuth authorization server is willing to enter
a user-agent flow with a client that has an HTTP redirector, then an attack similar to the one
above becomes possible, except that the malicious website is able to directly obtain the access
token instead of the authorization code, again using a triple redirection attack. It can then use
this access token to access the resource server APIs to steal an honest resource owner’s data.
ProVerif finds this attack as a violation of the APIResponse policy; since the access token has
been stolen, the resource owner can no longer reliably authenticate that it is only releasing user
data to the authorized client.
For example, we found such an attack on Yahoo, since it offers an HTTP redirector as part
of its search functionality. A malicious website can read the Facebook profile of any user who
has in the past used social login on Yahoo. It is interesting to note that even though Yahoo itself
never engages in the user-agent flow (it only uses authorization codes), Facebook is still willing
to enter into a user-agent flow with a website that pretends to be Yahoo, which leads to this
attack.
Code and Token Theft by Hosted User Content. A simpler variation of the above authentication
code and access token stealing attacks occurs on client websites that host user-controlled content
on URIs that can be valid redirect uris at the authorization server. For example, Dropbox allows
user content at dl.dropbox.com, and its registered domain at Facebook is just dropbox.com. Hence,
any user can upload an HTML file to dl.dropbox.com and by using the URI for this page as
redirect uri steal the Facebook access token for any other Dropbox user.
A special case of this attack is a Cross Site Scripting on the client website, whereby an
attacker can inject JavaScript into a trusted page. Such a script can steal the access token for
the current user from a variety of sources, including by starting a new OAuth user-agent flow
with the authorization server.
ProVerif finds these attacks as violations of the APIResponse policy, when we enable UntrustedJavaScript
or UntrustedWebsite on the client.
Cross Social-Network Request Forgery. Suppose an OAuth client supports social login with
multiple social networks, but it uses the same login endpoint for all networks. This is the case
on many websites that use the JanRain or GigYa libraries to manage their social login. So
far, we have assumed that all authorization servers are honest, but in this case, if one of the
authorization servers is malicious, it can steal an honest resource owner’s authorization code
and access token at any of the other authorization servers, by confusing the OAuth client about
which social network the user is logging in with.
For example, the JanRain website itself supports login with a number of OAuth providers, in-
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cluding Live, Facebook, LinkedIn, and SalesForce, but uses the same domain login.janrain.com
to host all its redirect uris. If any of these providers wanted to steal (say) a JanRain user’s Face-
book access token (or authorization code), it could redirect the user to Facebook’s authorization
server but with its own redirect uri on JanRain. When JanRain receives the token (or code)
response at this URI, it would assume that the token came from the malicious authorization
provider and send back the token (or code) with any subsequent APIRequest (or TokenRequest) to
the malicious provider.
In our model, if we enable multiple, potentially malicious, authorization servers, ProVerif
finds the above attack as a violation of the APITokenResponse policy on the authorization code
flow, and as a violation of APIResponse policy on the user-agent flow.
5.5 Discussion
Many of the attacks described in this work were known (or predicted) in theory, but their
existence in real websites were usually unknown before we reported them. We notified all the
websites mentioned in this paper, and most have since been fixed.
Our attacks rely on weaknesses in OAuth clients or authorization servers, and we find that
these do exist in practice. It is worth discussing why this may be the case.
CSRF attacks on websites are widespread and seem to be difficult to eradicate. We found
a login CSRF attack on the front page of Twitter, a highly popular website, and it seems this
vulnerability has been known for some time, and was not considered serious, except that it may
now be used as a login CSRF attack on any Twitter client. Our analysis finds such flaws, and
proposes a general rule-of-thumb: that any website action that leads to a social network action
should be protected from CSRF.
Open redirectors in client websites are another known problem, although most of the focus
on them is to prevent phishing. Our attacks rely more generally on any redirector that may
forward an OAuth token to a malicious website. We found three areas of concern. Search
engines like Yahoo use redirection URLs for pages that they index. URL shortening services
like Bitly necessarily offer a redirection service. Web hosting services such as WordPress offer
potentially malicious clients access to their namespace. When integrating such websites with
social networks, it becomes imperative to carefully delineate the part of the namespace that will
be used for social login and to ensure there are no redirectors allowed in this namespace.
More generally, websites that integrate OAuth 2.0 should use separate subdomains for their
security-critical pages that may have access to authorization codes and access tokens. For ex-
ample, Yahoo now uses login.yahoo.com as a dedicated sub-domain for login-related activities.
Pages on this domain can be carefully vetted to be free of web vulnerabilities, even if it may be
hard to fully trust the much larger yahoo.com domain.
The incorrect treatment of redirection URIs at authorization servers enables many of our
attacks. Contrarily to the OAuth 2.0 specification recommendations, Facebook does not require
the registration of the full client redirection URI, possibly in order to support a greater variety
of clients, but also because modern browsers only enforce client-side protections at the Origin
level. Finding a way to protect tokens from malicious pages in the same domain remains an open
problem and the subject of ongoing research.
Finally, a word of comparison between OAuth 2.0 and its competitors. OAuth 2.0 lacks
request and response authentication, which leads to several of the issues found in this paper.
Still, correct implementations of OAuth 2.0 do not suffer from these attacks. OAuth 1.0 featured
both request and response authentication, but it was deemed too difficult to implement for
widespread adoption; moreover, it was still vulnerable to session fixation attacks [31]. OpenID
2.0 features response authentication but not request authentication, which prevents some of
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Figure 6: Model extraction and verification framework
the attacks found in this paper but not attacks like OpenID Realm Phishing [47]. Despite its
shortcomings, OAuth 2.0 seems to be gaining traction, and upcoming single sign-on protocols
such as OpenID Connect [2] are being built on top of it. Formal analyses of such composite
protocols are an interesting topic for future work.
6 Generating WebSpi Models from Concrete Websites
We acknowledge the difficulty for most web programmer to write WebSpi models of their website
manually. To address this issue, we propose a framework for extracting user-agent and server-
app processes directly from the security-sensitive part of carefully-written websites. Our model
extraction framework, depicted in Figure 6, consists of three components:
 a subset of PHP equipped with a standard web library and its ProVerif counterpart;
 a subset of JavaScript equipped with a library for cryptography and secure communications
and its ProVerif counterpart;
 automatic translations from these PHP and JavaScript subsets to the applied pi-calculus.
The generated processes may then be composed with the WebSpi library and automatically
verified against the web application security goals. To support our translation, we extended the
WebSpi model with a more realistic treatment of JavaScript that allowed multiple processes to
share the same heap.
We focus on demonstrating the effectiveness of our translations rather than their soundness.
At their core, they follow Milner’s famous “functions as processes” encoding of the lambda
calculus into the pi calculus [37]. Similar translations to ours have previously been defined (and
proved sound) for F# [14] and Java [10].
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6.1 Syntax of Target PHP Subset
The syntax of the PHP subset that we translate to ProVerif is given below. Roughly speaking, a
program written in that subset looks like a binary tree of if statements, whose leaves are either
echo, die or redirect statements (similar to how WebSpi’s application processes can return




| ‘if(’ 〈if expr〉 ‘)’ 〈statement〉
(‘else’ 〈statement〉)?
| ‘{’ (〈expr〉 ‘;’)* 〈statement〉 ‘}’
| ‘echo sprintf(’ @string (‘,’ 〈expr〉)* ‘);’
| ‘die(’ @string ‘);’
| ‘redirect(’ 〈expr〉 ‘)’
〈if expr〉 ::= 〈if condition〉
| ‘isset(’ 〈parameter list〉 ‘)’
| ‘get_table(’ (〈qvar〉 ‘,’)* ‘)’
| ‘sscanf(’ @variable ‘,’ @string
(‘,’ @variable)* ‘)==’ @number
〈if condition〉 ::= ‘!’ 〈if condition〉
| 〈if condition〉 ‘&&’ 〈if condition〉
| 〈if condition〉 ‘||’ 〈if condition〉
| 〈expr〉 ‘===’ 〈expr〉
〈parameter list〉 ::=
| (‘$_GET[’ @string ‘],’)*
| (‘$_POST[’ @string ‘],’)*
〈qvar〉 ::= @variable | ‘&’ @variable
〈expr〉 ::=
| 〈expr〉 〈op〉 〈expr〉
| @variable ‘=’ 〈expr〉
| 〈if condition〉 ‘?’ 〈expr〉 ‘:’ 〈expr〉
| @label ‘(’ (〈expr〉 ‘,’)* ‘)’
| ‘$_’ (‘GET’ | ‘POST’) [’ @string ‘]’
| @variable | @string | @number
〈op〉 ::= [‘+’ ‘-’ ‘*’ ‘/’ ‘%’ ‘<<’ ‘>>’ ‘&’ ‘|’ ‘^’ ‘.’]
There are four kinds of if statements: normal conditions, parameter checking with isset,
database lookups with the library function get table and template parsing with sscanf. There
is no support for functions, objects, arrays (besides those containing input parameters) or any
kind of loop; while very limited compared to normal PHP, this subset is still expressive enough
to build meaningful applications, provided operations that require actual computation (such
as cryptographic primitives) are treated as calls to functions defined either in PHP’s standard
library or in an included file.
To demonstrate its usefulness, we implemented an example login provider for OAuth’s implicit
mode in this subset. The source code of the authorization handler is given in Table 7.
6.2 Translating PHP into ProVerif
At a high level, we require each PHP script to handle a single query path, for instance, login.php
is translated into the process LoginServerApp, with a path constructor loginPath (corresponding to
queries to /login.php). Before any other operation, the host and path of the script must be
matched against incoming requests. Thus, a server process starts with the following preamble,
which also introduces free names (headers, method, protocol, query string, cookie jar) required for
the translation:
fun loginPath(Path):Path [data].
let LoginServerApp(host:Host, app:Path) =
in(httpServerRequest, (url:Uri, headers:Headers, method:HttpRequest, corr:bitstring));
let uri(protocol, =host, =loginPath(app), query string) = url in
let cookie jar = getCookie(headers) in
P.
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PHP Source Translation
echo sprintf(T, e1, . . . , en)
fun dataConst T(bitstring,...,bitstring):bitstring [data].
out(httpServerResponse, (url,httpOk(










fun P get params(bitstring,..,bitstring):Params [data].
let P get params(get e1,get en) = query string in
if(isset($ POST[e1],..,$ POST[en]))
fun P post params(bitstring,..,bitstring):Params [data].
let httpPost(P post params(
post e1, ..., post en
)) = method in
if(get table(T, $vi,.., &$wj, ..)i,j) get T(var vi, ..., =var wj , ...) in
if(sscanf(s, T, &$e1,..,&$en)==n) let dataConst T(Je1K, . . . , JenK)=JsK in
session start()
if protocol(url) = https() then
let cookiePair(session cookie,path cookie) = cookie jar in
if secure(session cookie) <> nullCookie() then [...]
embed script(S,DOM,event)
let [P, S]UserAgent(b:Browser) = JSKJS
free script S:bitstring. [...] script S
f(e1, .., en) f(Je1K, . . . , JenK)
$ GET[’a’], $ POST[’a’] get a, post a
$ SESSION[’a’]
get serverSessions(=host, =session cookie,
sessionPair(=str a, session a)) in [...]
session a
$x = e let var x = JeK in
e + f, e.f... add(JeK, JfK), concat(JeK,JfK) ...
Table 3: Overview of the translation from PHP to ProVerif
Writing a script in this subset is very similar to writing a ProVerif process; the main elements
of the translation are given in Table 3.
For error handling purposes, many operations such as reading a database, accessing parame-
ters or parsing a template are performed within atomic if statements. Any missing else branch
is implicitly treated as else die(""); and translated to an httpError().
Before using session variables, the session cookie must be verified with a call to session -
start. To simulate the actual behavior of this function, the three checks in the translation of
session start have else branches that will create a session cookie (if missing) and redirect the
user to the same page (if required, over HTTPS). This behavior is only faithful if cookies are
enabled on the client.
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A typical script will first verify that its required parameters (either $ GET or $ POST, or
a combination of both) are present, perform access control (based on the user’s session), perform
some operations based on the input (such as looking up a database) and return either an HTML
result, represented by a data constructor that depends on all the dynamic values embedded in
the page, or an error message, or a redirection.
In most cases, the parameters of a script come from an HTML form or link. In theory, if
instead of using data constructors (sprintf) to represent HTML output, we directly parsed
the HTML output to extract all forms, their method, target action and field names, we could
generate User Agent processes to model the submission of forms. However, for now, we submit
forms in JavaScript, using accesses to the DOM document.forms[i].field, which we translate
to reading from a user input channel to construct the parameters of the form submission.
Constants are converted to symbolic names by hashing, to get consistent names between PHP
and JavaScript. Similarly, the name of a data constructor depends on the hash of its template.
We use sscanf to reconstruct serialized messages between PHP and JavaScript, and translate it
to a pattern match on the data constructor for the hashed template. The template may follow
a standard serialization format such as JSON.
We also use a library function get table("t", $x, ..., &$y) to perform database queries.
This function works exactly like the ProVerif construct get t(=x, ..., y): the variables that are
not passed by reference are used to construct the WHERE clause of the SQL query (the column
names are retrieved from the table schema), while the variables passed by reference are filled
with the result of the query (if multiple rows are selected, the first one is used).
To illustrate the translation on a concrete example, we provide the main section of the ProVerif
translation (excluding the preamble and declarations) of the authorization handler from Figure 7
in Figure 8.
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if(isset($ GET[’response type’],$ GET[’client id’],$ GET[’redirect uri’])) {
// Check response type
if($ GET[’response type’] == ”token”) {
// Check client id
if(get table(”clients”, $ GET[’client id’], &$client key)) {
// Is user logged in?
if($ SESSION[’is logged’] == ”yes”) {
// Is the client authorized already?
if(get table(”user auth”, $ SESSION[’username’], $ GET[’client id’], &$token)) {
redirect(sprintf(”%s#token=%s”, $ GET[’redirect uri’], $token));
} else { // Must authorize client
$auth code = hmac($ SESSION[’username’], $client key);
if(isset($ POST[’auth code’])) {
if($ POST[’auth code’] == $client key) {
insert table(”user auth”, $ SESSION[’username’], $ GET[’client id’], gen token());
redirect(my url());
} else die(”Invalid authorization key”);
} else {
echo sprintf(’<!DOCTYPE html><html><head>%s</head><body>
<h1>Do you want to authorize the application %s?</h1>
<form action=”%s”><input type=”hidden” name=”auth code” value=”%s” />
<input type=”submit” value=”Authorize” /></form>
<a href=”/”>Go back home</a></body></html>’,
embed script(”var k = document.forms[0].auth code;
post(my url(), ’auth code=’+k);”,”documents.forms[0]”,”submit”),
my url(), $ GET[’client id’], $client key);
}
}
} else redirect(sprintf(”/login.php?redirect=%s”,my url()));
} else die(”Invalid client ID”);
} else die(”Invalid response type parameter.”);
} else die(”Missing token request parameters.”);
Figure 7: OAuth authorization script in PHP
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let AuthServerApp(host:Host, app:Path) =
(...)
let Auth get params(get redirect uri,get client id,get response type)=query string in
if (get response type) = (str 15919241) then
get clients(=get client id,var client key) in
get serverSessions(=host, =session cookie, sessionPair(str 1035747747,val 1)) in
if (val 1) = (str 45715) then
get serverSessions(=host, =session cookie, sessionPair(str 737338002,val 2)) in
get user auth(=val 2,=get client id,var token) in
out(httpServerResponse, (url,httpRedirect(
parseUri(dataConst 898097875(get redirect uri,var token))
)),nullCookie(), corr))
else
get serverSessions(=host, =session cookie, sessionPair(str 737338002,val 3)) in
let var auth code = hmac(val 3,var client key) in
let httpPost(Auth params(post auth code)) = method in
if (post auth code) = (var client key) then
get serverSessions(=host, =session cookie, sessionPair(str 737338002,val 4)) in
out(httpServerResponse, (url,httpRedirect(url),nullCookie(), corr))
else
out(httpServerResponse, (url,httpError(),cookie jar, corr));
else
out(httpServerResponse, (url,httpOk(






Figure 8: ProVerif (partial) translation of the script in Figure 7
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6.3 Translating Client-Side JavaScript
Our JavaScript subset, whose syntax is given below, is more expressive than its PHP counterpart,
with support for functions, objects and arrays.
〈statement〉 ::= 〈expression〉
| ‘if(’ 〈expression〉 ‘)’ 〈statement〉
(‘else’ 〈statement〉)?
| ‘{’ (〈statement〉 ‘;’)* ‘}’
〈expression〉 ::= 〈literal〉
| 〈expression〉 〈binop〉 〈expression〉
| 〈lhs expression〉 ‘(’ (〈expression〉 ‘,’)* ‘)’
| 〈lhs expression〉 ‘=’ 〈expression〉
| 〈lhs expression〉
〈lhs expression〉 ::= @identifier
| 〈lhs expression〉 ‘[’ @number‘]’
| 〈lhs expression〉 ‘.’ @identifier
〈literal〉 ::= 〈function〉
| ‘{’ ( @identifier ‘:’ 〈expression〉 ‘,’)* ‘}’
| ‘[’ (〈expression〉 ‘,’)* ‘]’
| @number | @string | @boolean
〈function〉 ::=
‘function(’ (@identifier ‘,’)*‘){’
(‘var’ (@identifier ‘=’ 〈expression〉‘,’)+)?
(〈statement〉 ‘;’)*
(‘return’ 〈expression〉?)? ‘}’
〈binop〉 ::= [‘+’ ‘-’ ‘*’ ‘/’ ‘%’ ‘<<’ ‘>>’ ‘&’ ‘|’ ‘^’ ‘==’
‘!=’ ‘>’ ‘<’ ‘<=’ ‘>=’ ‘||’ ‘&&’]
Since JavaScript does not natively support features such as sscanf or encryption, we provide
them through a library. We distinguish such library functions with a special prefix, to distinguish
them from global variables the script may try to access.
Our translation from JavaScript to ProVerif reflects the shared memory model of the browser.
A single heap table in the browser stores pairs of locations and values on an origin (rather than
page) basis, to reflect the ability of same-origin pages to read each other’s variables. Because
JavaScript is asynchronous and event driven, we support the translation of functions and closures.
We intend each embedded script to correspond to the handler for one event (e.g. the page loading,
a form being submitted, a link being clicked). Thus, the embed script library function accepts
a script S, a target DOM element d and event name e, which is used to generate the concrete
script: d.addEventListener(e, function(){S}).
To illustrate the translation, we give in Figure 9 the login form event submission handler and
its user agent process translation. This script simply reads the username and password entered
in the login form, computes a login secret based on the username, password and salt and sends
the result along with the username as a POST query to the login script. If we wanted to include
a CSRF token, it would be set in the data constructor of the login form and accessible to the
user agent within the variable d.
6.4 Limitations
The main limitation of our approach is the requirement to use the very limited subset of PHP
in order to allow automated translation. Thus, this approach is not viable for the analysis of
large deployed websites. However, it is useful for designing new web applications. The initial
prototype can use our restricted subsets to implement the core features and protocols, which in
most cases are relatively simple. The functionality of the application is now modeled in PHP
and JavaScript, and can be directly tested. Moreover, thanks to the automated translation the
security of the design can be analyzed in WebSpi against various attacker models. Once the core
application has been tested and verified, it can be extended using all the features of PHP and
JavaScript into a fully featured website.
Another, more technical limitation of the translation is that, since ProVerif uses only sym-
bolic equality, a program such as if(1+1===2) echo "a"; else echo "b"; cannot be faithfully
translated. We work around this problem by ensuring compared values rely on a combination
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embed_script("
var u = document.forms[0].username;
var p = document.forms[0].password;
_lib.post(document.location,




let uri(=https(),=h,loginPath(app),=nullParams()) = u in
new var u:Memloc;
get user input(=u,=number zero,=in username,str 1) in
insert heap(origin(u),var u,mem string(str 1));
new var v:Memloc;
get user input(=u,=number zero,=in password,str 2) in
insert heap(origin(u),var p,mem string(str 2));
get heap(origin(u),=var u,mem string(val 1)) in
get heap(origin(u),=var p,mem string(val 2)) in
out(pageClick(b),(p1,u,httpPost(
dataConst 5656244(val 1,hmac(val 2,concat(str 780069777,val 1)))
))).
Figure 9: Login form handler and its translation
of input parameters, constants and symbolically safe operations (such as concatenation). Devel-
opers should be aware of the various issues related to parsing malleable formats, such as JSON
objects, URLs or query parameters.
Finally, even though model extraction is automatic, it is still up to the programmer to specify
his intended security goals and interpret the result of the verification.
7 Related Work
A number of other works present attacks on single sign-on and web authorization mechanisms like
OAuth 2.0 [43, 46, 44]. These attacks are similar to the ones discovered in our work and provide
further evidence for the need for a systematic formal security analysis of such mechanisms that
accounts for the precise details of the browser and common web vulnerabilities. In this Section,
we review previous work related to formal models of web browsing and formal analysis of web
authorization protocols similar to OAuth 2.0.
7.1 Formal models of web browsing
Gross et al. [30] model the communication behavior of web browsers as automata and use these
state machines to prove the security of a password-based authentication protocol by hand. Their
model does not cover cookies or scripts and hence does not cover most of the website attacks
discussed in this paper.
Yoshihama et al. [49] present a browser security model that relies on information flow labels
to enforce fine-grained access control, focusing on mashups. They describe the browser by means
of a big-step operational semantics that models the evaluation of client-side scripts. The model
includes multiple browser windows, the DOM, cookies and high-level HTTP requests. Some
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of the attacks we presented cannot be observed in that model. For example, CSRF attacks
are prevented by construction. By contrast, since our goal is to analyze protocols and detect
potential flaws, our browser model makes it possible to observe any sequence of events that
can be triggered by a combination of web users, client side scripts and server-provided pages,
including those leading to security violations.
Motivated by [49], Bohannon and Pierce [19] formalize the core of a web browser as an ex-
ecutable, small-step reactive semantics. The model gives a rather precise description of what
happens within a browser, including DOM tags, user actions to navigate windows, and a core
scripting language. Our formalization instead abstracts away from browser implementation de-
tails and focuses on web pages, client-side scripts and user behavior. Both [49] and [19] focus on
the web script security problem, that is how to preserve security for pages composed by scripts
from different sources. The model does not encompass features such as HTML forms, redirec-
tion and https which are important in our case to describe more general security goals for web
applications.
Akhawe et al. [7] propose a general model of web security, which consists of a discussion of
important web concepts (browsers, servers and the network), a web threat model (with users
and web, network and gadget attackers), and of two general web security goals: preserving
existing applications invariants and preserving session integrity. They implement a subset of this
general model in the Alloy protocol verifier [34]. Alloy lets user specify protocols in a declarative
object-modeling syntax, and then verify bounded instances of such protocols by translation to a
SAT solver. This formal subset of the web model is used on five different case studies, leading
to the re-discovery of two known vulnerability and the discovery of three novel vulnerabilities.
Our work was most inspired by [7], with notable differences. We directly express our formal
model in the variant of the applied pi-calculus, a formalism ideally suited to describe security
protocols in an operational way, that is focusing on a high-level view of the actions performed
by the various components of a web application. This approach reflects as closely as possible
the intuition of the human designer (or analyzer) of the protocol, and helps us in the systematic
reconstruction of attacks from formal traces. This language is also understood by the ProVerif
protocol analysis tool, that is able to verify protocol instances of arbitrary size, as opposed to
the bounded verification performed in Alloy.
Unbounded verification becomes important for flexible protocols such as OAuth 2.0, that
even in the simplest case involve five heterogeneous principals and eight HTTP exchanges. In
general, one may even construct OAuth configurations with a chain of authorization servers, say
signing-on to a website with a Yahoo account, and signing-on to Yahoo with Facebook. For
such extensible protocols, it becomes difficult to find a precise bound on the protocol model that
would suffice to discover potential attacks.
More recently, Bai et al. [29] present AUTHSCAN, an end-to-end tool to recover (and verify)
authentication protocol specifications from their implementations. AUTHSCAN is composed
of three modules. The first module extracts a protocol model by testing against an existing
implementation. This is the main focus of this work. We do not attempt to extract models
form protocol traces, but instead we provide an automated translation when the (PHP) source
code is available, and resort to manual model extraction when the source code is not available.
The second module, parametric in an attacker model and a set of security properties, verifies
the protocol model using either ProVerif, PAT or AVISPA. The authors mostly use ProVerif,
with a strict subset of our WebSpi attacker model [12]. This is a testament to the usefulness of
WebSpi as a general-purpose web-protocol analysis library. The third module aims to confirm
attacks discovered by the formal analysis instantiating the attack with the real-world data (IP
addresses, credentials) used for testing. We also reconstruct concrete attacks from ProVerif
traces, but we leave it to future work to make this process fully automatic. Unfortunately at
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the time of submission the implementation of AUTHSCAN is still not publicly available2, so we
cannot compare more closely our attack reconstruction techniques.
7.2 Formal analysis of web authorization
Early single sign-on protocols, such as Passport, Liberty, Shibboleth, and CardSpace were often
formally analyzed [39, 40, 32, 15, 9], but these analyses mainly covered their cryptographic design
against standard network-based adversaries, and do not account for the website attacks (such as
CSRF) discussed in this paper.
Pai et al. [38] adopt a Knowledge Flow Analysis approach [45] to formalize the specification
of OAuth 2.0 in predicate logics, a formalism similar to our Datalog-like policies. They directly
translate and analyze their logical specification in Alloy, rediscovering a previously known pro-
tocol flaw. Our ProVerif models are more operational, closer to a web programmer’s intuition.
Our analysis with respect to different classes of attackers is able to discover a larger number of
potential protocol abuses.
Chari et al. [22] analyze the authorization code mode of OAuth 2.0 in the Universal Com-
posability Security Framework [20]. They model a slightly revised version of the protocol that
assumes that both client and servers use TLS and mandates some additional checks. This model
is proven secure by a simulation argument, and is refined into an HTTPS-based implementation.
Miculan and Urban [36] model the Facebook Connect protocol for single sign-on using the
HLPSL specification language and AVISPA. Due to the lack of a specification of the protocol,
which is offered as a service by Facebook, they infer a model of Facebook Connect in HLPSL by
observing the messages effectively exchanged during valid protocol runs. Using AVISPA, they
identify a replay attack and a masquerade attack for which they propose and verify a fix.
The AUTHSCAN tool [29] described above is validated by analyzing single-sign-on web pro-
tocols, including Mozilla’s BrowserID and Facebook Connect, and discovering several fresh vul-
nerabilities. In particular, AUTHSCAN finds a vulnerability in Facebook Connect because it
infers from observed traces that one particular token-bearing message in not sent over HTTPS,
but is instead sent over HTTP. Our analysis did not discover this particular attack because we
decided to model Facebook as using HTTPS in all the token-bearing communications. The kind
of vulnerabilities we discovered tend to concern flaws in the design of a bug-free implementation,
whereas recovering models from traces seems also able to discover lower-level “implementation
bugs”.
8 Conclusions
We present a security analysis of the OAuth 2.0 protocol, using ProVerif, extended with the
WebSpi library that formalizes web users, applications and attackers. Our analysis establishes
both positive and negative security results, and the design of our library makes it easy to translate
formal counterexamples into concrete attacks on websites. The effectiveness of the approach is
validated by the discovery of several vulnerabilities in leading websites that use the OAuth 2.0
protocol. Expert human reviewers would have been able to find these attacks on a case-by-case
basis. Our contribution is to make this discovery systematic, and partially automated. The
models presented here do not cover some other common attacks, such as XSS, SQL Injection,
and DNS rebinding. In future work, we plan to extend WebSpi in order to capture also these
attacks, and verify more web security mechanisms and protocols.
2Personal communication with the authors of [29], 28/2/2013.
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A Example ProVerif Attacks on OAuth 2.0 Websites
Automatic Login and Social Sharing CSRF (on CitySearch and Facebook).
let CitysearchFacebookAttack(csSocialLoginUri:Uri,
csReviewSubmitUri:Uri,eveAppUri:App) =























(* Eve logs in to Facebook *)








(* Eve authorize IMDB as a Client for Eve@Facebook *)
let C3 = httpRequestResponse(sid,facebookOAuthUri,httpGet()) in
out (admin,C3);
in (result,(=C3,(=sid,=sp,httpOk(form2))));
let C4 = httpRequestResponse(sid,facebookOAuthUri,
httpPost(oauthFormReply(form2))) in
out (admin,C4);
(* Eve intercepts her Authorization Code for IMDB *)




let C6 = httpRequestResponse(sid,fb,httpGet()) in
out (admin,C6);
in (result,(=C6,(=sid,=sp,httpRedirect(im))));
(* Alice browses to Eve’s website *)
let C7 = getServerRequest(eveAppUri) in
Inria




(* Eve redirects Alice to login to IMDB using Eve’s Authorization Code *)




Resource Theft by Access Token Redirection (on Yahoo and Facebook).
let YahooFacebookAttack(facebookOAuthUri:Uri,
facebookGraphAPI:Uri,eveAppUri:App,
yahoo app id:Id, yahoo eve redirector:Uri) =
(* Alice browses to Eve’s website *)




(* Eve redirects Alice to Facebook’s OAuth Server
using redirect uri=yahoo eve redirector *)
new state:Cookie;
let authUri = uri(ep(facebookOAuthUri),
oauthRequest(yahoo app id,state,
ep(yahoo eve redirector))) in




(* Alice is redirected to yahoo eve redirector with
her access token for Yahoo, which redirects her back to Eve *)




let oauthToken(=state,token) = params(u2) in
(* Eve uses Alice’s access token to steal her Facebook data *)
let dataUri = uri(ep(facebookGraphAPI),oauthDataRequest(token)) in
let C4 = httpRequestResponse(nullCookiePair(),dataUri,httpGet()) in
out (admin,C4);
in (result,(=C4,(sid:Cookie,sp:Principal,httpOk(data)))).
Unauthorized Social Login by Auth Code Redirection (on WordPress and Facebook).
let WordpressFacebookAttack(wpSocialLoginUri:Uri,
eveAppUri:App, wp app id:Id,wp eve redirector:Uri) =
(* Eve starts to ”Login with Facebook” on Wordpress *)
let C1 = httpRequestResponse(nullCookiePair(),
wpSocialLoginUri,httpGet()) in
out (admin,C1);
(* Eve intercepts the authorization request to Facebook
and modifies redirect uri to wp eve redirector *)
in (result,(=C1,(sid:Cookie,sp:Principal,httpRedirect(fb))));
let oauthRequest(app id,state,redirect ep) = params(fb) in
let newParams = oauthRequest(app id,state,ep(wp eve redirector)) in
let newUri = uri(ep(fb),newParams) in
(* Alice browses to Eve’s website *)
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(* Eve redirects Alice to modified Facebook authrization URI *)




(* Alice is redirected to wp eve redirector with
her access code for Wordpress, which redirects her back to Eve *)




let oauthCode(=app id,=state,as,code) = params(u2) in
(* Eve logs into Wordpress using this code pretending to
respond to the original authorization request *)
let loginUri = uri(redirect ep,oauthCode(app id,state,as,code)) in
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